The Concept of Habit and the Regularities of Social Structure by Crossley, Nick
abstract
keywords




in this paper i discuss the concept of habit from a sociological point of view. my aim, in 
part, is to consider the ways in which sociologists and social philosophers could use and 
have used ‘habit’ in their analyses and explanations. in particular the concept of habit 
can contribute to our understanding and explanation of the behavioural regularities 
involved in social structure. in addition, however, i am interested in the limitations of the 
concept of habit, within a sociological context, when compared against other concepts 
which are used to do similar work. in particular i contrast the concept of habit with the 
concepts of ‘rule’ and ‘convention’, drawing out the strengths that it has relative to those 
competing concepts but also identifying important aspects of behavioural regularity 
which they bring to light and which habit ignores. in the conclusion to the paper i 
consider ways in which these various concepts might overlap and might be used in 
conjuction with one another.
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in this paper i approach ‘habit’ as a sociologist. i am interested in the 
way that both ‘habit’ and the related concept of ‘habitus’ (see below) are 
used, particularly in the context of ‘theories of practice’ and even more 
particularly in those theories of practice which build upon the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1992), to explain the regular and enduring patterns of 
social interaction (that is, the social practices) that form a central element 
of ‘social structure’1. habit is a crucial concept for these purposes, in my 
view, but it is a limited concept which only captures one element of what is 
involved in these regular and enduring patterns. my aim here is to identify 
and explore some of these limitations, delimiting more precisely the role 
habit that plays in the reproduction of social life whilst also considering 
the elements of that process that it doesn’t capture. i do this by contrasting 
‘habit’ with two concepts which are sometimes used to do the same analytic 
work as it but which have fallen out of favour as ‘habit’ has risen to the fore 
in sociological thought: rule and convention. i will argue that they do not, in 
fact, do the same work; that each draws out a distinct aspect of the regular 
and enduring patterns of interactivity that interest sociologists and that 
sociologists would do well to attend to these differences and to the range of 
concepts necessary to adequately grasp them. we need the concepts of rule 
and convention as well as the concept of habit if we are to fully understand 
and enjoy the capability to analyse the enduring patterns of interaction 
which (partly) constitute social structures. From the point of view of 
specific focus of this special edition, namely, habit, I hope that this offers 
a useful interrogation of its sociological meaning and scope. i begin with a 
brief account the concept’s somewhat chequered history within sociology 
and of the role accorded it in explaining social structure.
in sociology, as in other academic discourses, the concept of habit has 
undergone various reappraisals and changes of meaning across time (camic 
1986). early sociologists used the concept, positively, to denote acquired 
dispositions of a fairly broad nature, perceiving it to be entirely compatible 
with their understanding of human action as purposive and intelligent. 
in the early twentieth century, however, partly as an effect of the rise 
1 other key elements of social structure are patterns of connection between the participants 
in particular ‘social worlds’ and the distribution of resources between them.
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of behaviourist psychology and physiology, with their mechanistic and 
reductive explanations of human action, sociologists began to think of 
habits as largely involuntary behavioural ticks; inconsequential, devoid of 
meaning and for these reasons sociologically uninteresting (ibid.). elements 
of the old concept of habit were maintained in such concepts as custom, 
tradition and even perhaps culture but ‘habit’ itself was dropped from the 
lexicon. more recently, however, habit has made a comeback. The work 
of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1992), in particular, has put the concept of 
‘habitus’ at the heart of contemporary sociological thought, and that in turn 
has prompted a return, in some quarters, to ‘habit’ itself.
i have discussed the (lack of) difference between ‘habit’ and ‘habitus’ 
elsewhere (crossley 2013). it very much depends, i have suggested, whose 
concept of habit and whose concept of habitus one refers to. For every 
theorist, such as Bourdieu or marcel mauss (1979), who develops a concept 
of habitus, distinguishing it from ‘mere habit’, there is another, such as 
maurice merleau-Ponty (1962) or John dewey (1988), who has sought to 
rescue ‘habit’ itself from a reductive behaviourist understanding, refusing 
to relegate it to the domain of simple, insignificant and mechanical 
behaviours. restoring something of its original meaning, they locate habit 
within behaviour which is meaningful, intelligent, rational and sometimes 
strategic. in addition, they discuss collective habits, formed and diffusing 
within social networks whose members they serve to mark out as distinct 
social groups: e.g. social classes, nations and ethnic groups.
Furthermore, they identify the sociological importance of habit as a 
mechanism which anchors socially and historically variable forms of 
conduct, physically, lending the society or social world to which they belong 
durability and a relatively stable structure. Society persists on a day-by-day 
basis, they suggest, because its forms have become habitually engrained 
within the behavioural repertoires of its members. william James captures 
this in a widely cited passage, adding the important further observation that 
habit contributes to social reproduction because it entails desensitisation 
to inequalities and hardships which, were they to be experienced with full 
force, rising to the forefront of consciousness, might provoke discontent and 
uprising:
Habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent. it alone is what keeps us all within the bounds 
of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious 
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uprisings of the poor. it along prevents the hardest and most repulsive 
walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. 
It keeps the fisherman ... at sea .... It dooms us all to fight out the battle 
of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice ... it is too late 
to begin again. it keeps different social strata from mixing. (James 
1892, 143)
James anticipates many of the key elements of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus 
in this passage, not least the sense that habits are formed in particular 
social worlds, whose structure they subsequently reproduce. actors adapt 
their behaviour to fit the social worlds in which they find themselves. This 
gives rise to habits which both attach the actor to that world and contribute 
to its reproduction; shaping the actor’s behaviour in a way which then 
shapes the world in question. To quote Bourdieu himself, habitus are:
... durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu 1992, p.53)
Pragmatists (dewey in particular) and phenomenologists (merleau-Ponty 
in particular but also husserl (1973, 1990)) make a crucial contribution to 
this renewed focus upon ‘habit’, opening up and exploring the nature of 
habit to a far greater extent than Bourdieu. They ground the concept by 
illuminating and exploring its place in everyday activity and experience. 
They challenge its behaviourist framing both with detailed critiques 
which reveal the inadequacy of behaviourist theory to explain even its 
own experimental findings (Merleau-Ponty 1965, Dewey 1896) and also 
through careful phenomenological analyses of familiar habits which refute 
any notion of mechanical repetition and show rather how habit enables 
skilled improvisation and how it can be transposed to novel situations. 
Furthermore, they understand habits as open to revision in the context 
of an engagement between the organism and its environment, and they 
expand the scope of the concept beyond simple motor functions to the 
realms of perception and reflective thought, simultaneously exploring how 
these realms are intertwined (crossley 2001, 2013).
Finally, connecting with the key sociological theme identified at the outset 
THE CONCEPT Of HABIT AND THE REgUlARITIES Of SOCIAl STRUCTURE  
nicK croSSley university of manchester
181
of this paper, they explore the key link between habit, history (and thus 
temporality) and identity (both individual and social). habit, they argue, lends 
continuity to our lives, making me the same person tomorrow as i was today 
and allowing projects begun at one point in time to be completed at another. as 
such it contributes to our freedom and capacity for choice. choice is meaningful 
because it achieves traction and anchorage in my life through force of habit. at 
the collective level, this same mechanism ensures the continuity of history and 
the distinctiveness of particular periods within it. The human organisms who 
populate different historical periods do not differ greatly qua organisms but 
their habits do and this makes a huge difference. 
note that habit facilitates both conservation and change in this account or 
rather the conservation that is integral to change. habit preserves aspects of 
the past within the present, facilitating actions which build upon that past 
in pursuit of a future. it is because of habit that our activities, individual and 
collective, never emerge ex nihilo. as James emphases in the above-cited 
passage, we cannot ‘begin again’. The present must always build upon the past as 
preserved within habit and the clock is never, can never be turned back.
it will be apparent that i deem habit or habitus (i will use ‘habit’ to refer to 
both hereafter) a crucial mechanism in the reproduction of the social world. as 
noted in the introduction to this paper, however, it is, like any scientific concept, 
selective, drawing certain aspects of the empirical world into the foreground of 
our attention, at the expense of others which may also be important. we must 
reflect upon these others too if we are to achieve a satisfactory account. 
one particular concern that i have with habit is that it locates ‘social 
structure’ entirely within the individual failing to engage with the 
intersubjective and more broadly relational nature of the social world qua 
social. habits are individual dispositions and even collective habits are 
mere aggregations of individual habits. They can and i believe that they 
usually do take shape within the context of social interaction but this 
social dimension is not captured within the concept of habit itself, which, 
as noted, tracks it back into the individual. This individualised element 
is important and i will defend it. however, it is not the whole story. Social 
worlds are networks of interacting and interdependent actors, both human 
and corporate2 (crossley 2011). The structure of these networks is a further 
2 By ‘corporate actors’ I mean such as organizations as firms, trade unions and governments, 
which involve mechanisms of collective decision making and means of implementing their 
decisions.
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element of social structure, and the behavioural regularities focused upon 
in this paper are not only anchored by means of habit but also by relational 
means, within these networks. 
in what follows i will tease this out by contrasting the concept of habit 
with the concepts of ‘rule’ and ‘convention’ respectively. in contrast to 
habit, both ‘rule’ and ‘convention’ imply interconnection and a discussion 
of them allows me to demonstrate why connection is important. i will 
not be arguing against ‘habit’, however. where habit, rule and convention 
are discussed together theorists typically argue for one over the others. 
Bourdieu (1990) famously argues for habitus over rule, for example, and 
Peter Winch (1958) argues in favour of rule over habit. I briefly review 
both arguments, identifying merit in them but the either/or framing is 
problematic and unnecessary in my view because each concept identifies 
a different and important mechanism at play within regular patterns of 
behaviour. Furthermore, though the three mechanisms are often found 
together each is sometimes found in the absence of the other, and they 
can conflict, such that we must distinguish between them in our analytic 
toolbox. i begin by considering winch’s critique of ‘habit’.
winch draws a comparison between habits and rules in his path-breaking 
study, The idea of a Social Science. having argued for the importance of rules, 
drawing upon wittgenstein (1953), he observes that much of the work which 
he assigns to ‘rules’ in his account is assigned to ‘habit’ in the work of his 
contemporary, michael oakeshott (1991, 1999). winch accepts a broader and 
richer account of habit than was typical at his time of writing and is not, 
therefore, entirely dismissive of oakeshott. however, he does not believe 
that ‘habit’ can play the role which he attributes to rules:
oakeshott appears to think that the dividing line between behaviour 
which is habitual and that which is rule-governed depends on whether 
or not a rule is consciously applied. in opposition to this i want to say 
that the test of whether a man’s [sic] actions are the application of 
a rule is not whether he can formulate it but whether it makes sense 
to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things ... 
where that makes sense then it must also make sense to say that he 
is applying a criterion in what he does even though he does not and 
perhaps cannot formulate that criterion. (winch 1958, p.58, emphasis 
in original)
Habit and Rule
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His first objection, outlined above, is that social practice has a normative 
aspect which is captured by ‘rule’ but not ‘habit’. Social behaviour can be 
and often is judged right and wrong, either in a moral or a technical sense, 
by those involved. ‘rule’ entails this normative element, ‘habit’ does not 
and ‘rule’, therefore, is the preferable concept. his second objection is that 
the regularities of interaction that these normative judgements refer to and 
which i have previously referred to in this paper are not mere repetitions of 
a set behavioural pattern, as ‘habit’, on his interpretation of that concept, 
would imply, but rather appear regular in virtue of their adherence to an 
underlying principle, as the concept of ‘rule’ would suggest. Following a 
rule does not always mean acting in an identical fashion across time and 
different social contexts, he observes. it entails understanding the rule, and 
understanding, as wittgenstein famously claims, entails the capacity to ‘go 
on’, extending and/or applying a rule beyond the limited range of examples 
involved in one’s leaning of it. like the individual who is able to continue a 
number series further than they have heard it recited, continuing ‘12, 15, 18 
..’ after hearing ‘3, 6, 9 ...’, social actors act in accordance with rules which 
they have learned and understood without exactly replicating forms of 
conduct which they have seen others perform in the past. Their interactivity 
manifests understanding of a rule rather than habitual repetition.
curiously, Bourdieu uses a very similar observation to winch to argue 
against the concept of rules and in favour of habit. For him ‘rule’ implies 
rigidity of conduct whilst habit or at least habitus implies a flexible 
disposition and ‘feel for the game’ which allows the actor to spontaneously 
improvise in unfamilar situations. The strategic action of the footballer, who 
is constantly innovating and improvising in response to the state of play is 
an example of habitus for Bourdieu. Furthermore, most of the revisionist 
accounts of habit that i referred to above equate habit with understanding 
and knowledge, bringing ‘habit’ much closer to ‘rule’ than winch’s account 
suggests. merleau-Ponty, for example, views habits as forms of embodied 
understanding and know-how:
we said earlier that it is the body which understands in the acquisition 
of habit. This way of putting it will appear absurd, if understanding is 
subsuming a sense datum under an idea, and if the body is an object. 
But the phenomenon of habit is just what prompts us to revise our 
notion of ‘understand’ and our notion of the body. To understand 
is to experience harmony between what we aim at and what is 
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given, between intention and the performance – and the body is our 
anchorage in the world. (1962, 144)
habit is embodied know-how for merleau-Ponty, which allows the actor to 
spontaneously adapt to unfolding situations in a manner intelligently and 
rationally adapted to those situations, given the actor’s goals.
it follows from this, contra winch, that the same habit may give rise to 
a variety of behavioural responses, across different situations, unified 
only by their manifestation of the same basic understanding. in winch’s 
defence, however, we might argue that understanding is always necessarily 
understanding-of something or other and we would therefore have to ask 
what is understood in habit? The answer will vary according to the habit 
in question. however, if that habit is amongst those which are constitutive 
of social structure then it seems inevitable that what it will grasp is a 
rule of some sort. indeed the concept of understanding seems logically to 
entail ‘rules’, in winch’s wittgensteinian sense, because it must entail the 
possibility of misunderstanding or not understanding and therefore right 
and wrong ways of going on. Furthermore, we might ask whether Bourdieu’s 
‘feel for the game’ does not necessarily entail constitutive ‘rules’ of the 
game. what does an actor have a feel for when they have a feel for the game 
if not rules which define the objectives and constraints of the game?
equally importantly, winch’s insistence that ‘rule’ implies that there is a 
right and a wrong way of doing things does identity an important element of 
social structure that is not captured by the concept of habit. Social practices 
are not only regular and enduring. They have a normative character such 
that those involved sometimes correct both themselves and others, drawing 
a distinction between right and wrong ways of going on. ‘rules’ captures 
this but ‘habit’ has no such normative implication. habits might be good or 
bad but only in relation to a rule or standard which is extraneous to them. 
The point here is not to deny that rule-following is sometimes habitual. it is 
and this doubtless contributes to the survival of particular rules. The point, 
rather, is that there is an important normative aspect to social structure 
which ‘habit’ does not capture. i return to this. Presently, however, i will 
continue the critique of habit.
Though winch is careful to allow that social actors may not be able to 
formulate the rules they understand and orient to, breaches of rules in 
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social circumstances are likely to be noticed by those who understand the 
rule and may occasion reflective attempts at correction. Likewise for the 
individual actor who confronts a situation where application of the rule is 
not straightforward:
...questions of interpretation and consistency, that is, matters for reflection, 
are bound to arise for anyone who has to deal with a situation foreign to 
his previous experience. (winch 1958, 64, emphasis in original) 
Most rules are not subject to reflection for much of the time, on Winch’s 
understanding, but in the context of a rapidly changing social world any 
rule might be elevated into conscious reflection. In this respect Winch 
balances the attention to pre-reflective activities often afforded in 
accounts of habit with a focus upon the  role of reflective intelligence and 
understanding. our patterns of interaction are not completely habitual. 
Periodically they come into question and what we reflect upon in such 
circumstances –i.e. how to go on- bears upon the principle underlying our 
action; that is to say, rules.
Building upon winch i would add that rules are also important because, 
at least as defined by Wittgenstein (1953), they are irreducibly social. They 
exist not within but between individuals, within a social network. They 
rest upon ‘agreement in forms of life’ and therefore presuppose at least two 
actors who ‘agree’ upon them (often more, of course). habits, by contrast, 
even where shared and therefore collective, are properties of individuals. 
even collective habits are only aggregations of individual habits. a collective 
habit is an individual habit that happens to be shared, and habits can be 
strictly individual (at least in theory). By contrast a rule exists only in the 
context of social relations between multiple individuals. rules are relational 
and, as such, they permit us to explore the genuinely social nature of social 
life.
Furthermore, where rules are supported by sanctions this too adds a 
relational dimension to structure. actor a acts as she does, following a 
rule, because actor B will punish her if she does not. This situation may be 
reciprocal. a and B may each be in a position to sanction one another for 
rule violation. in some cases, however, only one of the two may have the 
means to sanction the other, a position which arguably allows her also to 
impose the rule to which the other must adhere. in this case we would deem 
the power balance within the relation between a and B to be assymetrical. 
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whatever the precise details, however, the key point is that relations matter 
and that relations are not captured by ‘habit’.
The various advantages of the concept of rule do not amount to an argument 
for using it instead of the concept of habit, however. on this point i disagree 
with winch. Just as ‘rule’ captures certain aspects of regular patterns 
of social interaction missed by ‘habit’ so to ‘habit’ captures aspects that 
are neglected by ‘rule’. not only is it perfectly meaningful to refer to 
habits which are individual and therefore not rule-following, it is equally 
meaningful to distinguish between instances of rule following which are 
habitual and instances which are not. Though it does not occur to winch 
that rule following may sometimes be habitual, for example, we have seen 
that he distinguishes between situations where rule following involves 
reflection and situations where it does not. Furthermore, where rule 
following is habitual there will always have been a time at which it was not; 
that is, a time at which some degree of conscious effort was required to 
follow the rule.
The concept of rules captures the pattern adhered to by actors in particular 
situations and the normative aspect involved but it does not explain why 
actors adhere to rules. There may be many such explanations, from the 
desire to do the right thing through to fear of punishment for doing the 
wrong thing, but these all presuppose that rule following is a reflective 
activity; that an act of decision and a degree of conscious effort is involved. 
habit adds a further possibility. it alerts us to the way in which certain 
patterns or principles of conduct, that is to say, certain rules, are conserved 
within the pre-reflective ‘structures of behaviour’ which underpin our 
reflective life such that they become, from the point of view of the actor, 
automatic. habit is a mechanism which explains some (but not all) instances 
of rule following. 
as ‘rule’ and ‘habit’ each do a different job in explaining and rendering 
social practices intelligible i would suggest that we do not consider their 
respective merits in either/or terms but rather look to keep both in our 
analytic toolbox. in the conclusion to this paper i return to this suggestion. 
Before i do, however, i want to introduce a third concept into the discussion: 
convention.
Like ‘habit’ and ‘rule’, ‘convention’ is defined in a variety of ways both 
within and outside of social science. We find an interesting use, however, 
Convention
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in the philosophical work of david lewis (1969) and the sociological work 
of howard Becker (1982), who draws (selectively) upon lewis. conventions, 
for lewis are solutions to ‘coordination problems’ and involve mutual 
expectations between actors as to how each will interact in a given 
situation. in many circumstances in social life social actors need to 
coordinate their activity, lewis observes. Various possibilities for acting are 
open to them, any of which would equally well serve their purposes, as long 
as the others involved make a complementary choice. Thus, in the UK, we 
drive on the left side of the road. we could drive on the right, as is common 
elsewhere, but as long as we all drive on the same side it doesn’t matter. 
where a particular option is settled upon, lewis argues, we may speak of 
convention. a convention is a course of action, integral to the solution of a 
coordination problem, which all (or at least most) relevant actors within a 
given population orient to.
lewis’ concept of convention is important because, like ‘rule’, it draws 
out a relational aspect to social structure which is not entailed in ‘habit’ 
(even collective habit) and which habit arguably ignores; namely, that 
social activity requires coordination and thus ‘agreement’3 between those 
involved. Social activity is inter-activity, interaction, and its regularities 
cannot therefore be grasped entirely by reference to a concept (habit) which 
captures the manner in which forms of conduct are conserved within the 
action repertoires of discrete individuals. Just as the concept of habit does 
not entail that action might be right or wrong, as suggested by rule, neither 
does it address the issue of coordination and the intersubjective agreement 
this involves. ‘conventions’ are ways in which we act together rather than, 
as in the case of habit, individual instantiations of action which may or may 
not be found across multiple individuals.
Furthermore, like rules, conventions necessarily exist between people, in 
interaction. a convention only exists when at least two people ‘agree’, often 
tacitly and in practice, about how each will act in certain situations.
in some instances conventions will involve a normative element and thus 
have a rule-like nature. however, this is not necessarily so. There are two 
types of counter-example. Firstly, some conventions lack a normative element 
because their arbitrariness is recognised and/or deviation does not cause huge 
3 This is not to say that parties to a convention actually come to a reflective consensus but 
rather than they act in complementary ways. To paraphrase wittgenstein, they agree, not 
(necessarily) in opinions but in forms of life.
Conventions 
and Rules
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coordination problems. Parties to a convention recognise that other ways of 
behaving in a situation would be entirely appropriate, only sticking to what 
they do because agreement between their respective ways of behaving is useful 
to them. Friends who regularly meet at a particular table in a café may be said 
to have established a convention, for example, which eases the coordination 
of lunchtime meetings between them but this is unlikely to be regarded as 
normatively binding. If the first to arrive at the café fancies sitting somewhere 
else for a change the second will not deem this wrong (either morally or 
technically), unless it proves particularly disruptive or inconvenient. Similarly, 
if somebody else is sat at their seat when they arrive they might regard this as 
an inconvenience but not as a breach of a rule. 
Secondly, challenges to convention are sometimes viewed positively, 
especially in aesthetic domains. The musicologist leonard meyer (1956), for 
example, argues that the pleasure generated by music stems in large part 
from the composer and/or performer playing with and bending conventions 
and thereby teasing the audience. The audience expect a passage that has 
begun like ‘this’ to finish like ‘that’, for example, because that is how such 
sequences conventionally run. Knowing this, however, the performer 
deviates from the convention, generating tension within their audience 
which they will later release either by diverting to another convention 
or establishing a non-conventional pattern which they audience can at 
least recognise as a pattern and which might become a new convention. 
‘Convention’ is defined here much as Lewis defines it. It involves shared 
expectation. The audience expect certain things of the performer/composer 
and the performer/composer expects that they expect it. Furthermore, 
these expectations facilitate coordination and communication between 
the two parties. The aesthetic effect is only achieved to the extent that 
the audience, following convention, react in the way that the composer/
performer expects. however, meyer’s composer/performer plays with and 
deviates from convention herself, and though this may sometimes be met 
with negative sanctions it can also be an occasion for praise and positive 
sanctions. Though the concepts of convention and rule sometimes overlap, 
therefore, this is not always so and we have good reason to keep both, 
distinguishing between them, in our analytical toolbox. in what follows i 
will show that the same is true for ‘habit’ and ‘convention’.
as with ‘rules’, the advantages that the concept of convention affords us do not 
merit our choosing it over ‘habit’ because ‘convention’ does not do the work of 
‘habit’ any more than ‘habit’ does the work of ‘convention’. conventions can 
be habitual but not always. To give an example which covers both rules and 
Habit and 
Convention
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conventions: when i drive in the UK i follow the convention and the rule of 
driving on the left hand side of the road, and i do so by force of habit. it does 
not occur to me to do otherwise. i get in the car and pull onto the left-hand 
side of the road. if an occasion were to arise in which another road user drove 
on the right i would be shocked, evidencing a taken for granted (i.e. habitual) 
expectation about the behaviour of others, as is proper to convention, and i 
would no doubt feel a sense of moral outrage, evidencing the normative weight 
(and thus rule-like nature) of this convention, but in most cases in the UK 
everybody drives on the left, by force of habit, and insofar as we notice at all it 
feels natural to do so. when in France, by contrast, i drive on the right hand side 
of the road. This does not come naturally to me. it is not a habit. indeed it goes 
against my habitual inclination. i know what i ought to do, have expectations 
about how others will drive and have expectations about how they will expect 
me to drive but this largely arises in my reflective consciousness and I find that I 
have to remind myself what to do, especially when approaching challenges such 
as those presented by a roundabout. driving on the right feels strange, at least 
at first, until I get used to it (habituate to it) and begin to form a habit of driving 
on the right. 
it might be argued that such driving conventions/rules only work because they 
are habitual for the vast majority of drivers. This is no doubt true but the fact 
that we can follow such conventions/rules even when they are not habitual 
indicates that ‘habit’ adds something to our analysis that neither ‘convention’ 
nor ‘rule’ in themselves entail, just as they each make a unique contribution, 
covered neither by the other nor by habit. 
The work that ‘habit’ performs in relation to ‘convention’, to reiterate what i 
said with respect to habit and rules, is to lend them stability and durability by 
anchoring them within the individual, beneath the level of reflective decision, 
where their instigation and execution would always potentially be open to 
question. habits may be called into question, of course, and may become subject 
to conscious attempts at cultivation and/or destruction. however, habitual 
action, for the most part, is action which is triggered and executed without the 
intervention of reflective thought. 
removing structures of behaviour from the realm of choice and conscious 
deliberation increases their regularity and durability by rendering them 
‘automatic’. all things being equal an actor will behave in a habitual manner 
within a familiar situation. The selection and filtering which reflective 
deliberation affords is bypassed. in addition, habituation lowers the costs 
of action, in terms of effort, generating a degree of inertia. it is much 
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easier to act as we habitually act than to devise new ways of acting, and 
even where we consider alternatives, therefore, we may still revert to habit 
unless changes in our situation have significantly reduced their use value. 
in a further twist, moreover, habits have the effect of naturalising certain 
behaviours. in part this is a matter of putting them outside of the realm 
of discourse. if we do not need to think about doing them then we may not 
even notice that we do them and will certainly be less inclined to think 
about or question them if we do. even if we do question them, however, the 
fact that they come so easily to us will often incline us to suppose that they 
are ‘natural’ ways of acting.
Defined in this way ‘habit’ potentially conflicts with ‘convention’ as 
Lewis understands it. A defining feature of convention, for Lewis, is our 
awareness that we could act otherwise. Patterns of interaction which are 
believed to be ‘natural’ and perhaps even those executed without reflective 
awareness would not qualify fully as conventions from this point of view. 
Lewis offers no good reason for this particular aspect of his definition of 
convention, however, and i believe that it has counter-intuitive implications. 
a convention might cease to be a convention over time, for example, as 
social actors forget about its arbitrariness and it becomes taken for granted. 
conversely a behaviour which is taken-for-granted will only become a 
convention when its taken-for-grantedness is challenged. more strangely 
still, the same behaviour might be a convention for some of the people 
who engage in it (those aware of alternatives) but not for others (those who 
deem it natural). it is certainly true that, as analysts, we will not recognise 
a convention as such unless we are aware that other arrangements are 
possible but the requirement that lay actors share that awareness is 
unnecessary. actors need not be aware that an arrangement is conventional 
in order for it to be conventional.
Habit, convention and rule are not, as Bourdieu’s and Winch’s reflections 
on habit and rule each seem to suggest, alternative ways of conceptualising 
the same thing. rather, each concept picks out a different aspect of social 
practice. ‘Rule’ identifies a normative aspect: actors act in a way which their 
peers deem correct and/or believe that they ought to act. Furthermore, 
it identifies an underlying principle or criteria which actors understand 
and apply in their activity. ‘Convention’ identifies the way in which 
particular ways of acting resolve coordination problems and involve mutual 
expectations about the behaviour of self and other. ‘Habit’ identifies the 
anchoring of understanding and expectations in the pre-reflective life of the 
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embodied agent.
each of these aspects is important and in many cases each will be 
simultaneously in play, as my UK driving example suggests. however, i hope 
i have also shown that any one may be absent in a particular situation. This 
is why we need to distinguish the three. we may elaborate upon this by way 
of a Venn diagram.
The diagram presents seven possibilities for the possible interplay of 
habit, convention and rule. Any specific instance of regular and enduring 
behaviour will fit into one of these seven possibilities. We may use the 
diagram as an analytic tool for considering the specific interplay of these 
factors involved in concrete cases of regular/enduring behaviour.
The reflections offered in this paper only begin to scratch at the surface. A 
proper understanding of social practice requires further and much more 
nuanced differentiation of the various mechanisms in play within it. This 
includes those focused upon here, those gestured towards (e.g. sanctions 
and balances of power) but no doubt many more besides. i hope that i have 
at least made a start here, however.
convention rule
habit
Figure 1.1: habit, rule and convention
THE CONCEPT Of HABIT AND THE REgUlARITIES Of SOCIAl STRUCTURE  
nicK croSSley university of manchester
192
REFERENCES
Becker, h. (1982) art Worlds, Berkeley, University of california Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, cambridge, cambridge 
University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1984) distinction, london, rKP.
Bourdieu, P. (1990) From rules to Strategies, in in Other Words, cambridge, 
Polity, 59-75.
Bourdieu, P. (1992) The logic of Practice, cambridge, Polity.
camic, c. (1986) The matter of habit, american Journal of Sociology 91, 1039-87.
crossley, n. (2011) Towards relational Sociology, london, routledge.
crossley, n. (2013) habit and habitus, Body and Society 19(2/3), 136-61.
Dewey, J. (1896) The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology, Psychological review 3, 
363-70.
dewey, J. (1988) human nature and Conduct, carbondale, Southern illinois 
University Press. 
husserl, e. (1973) experience and Judgement, evanston, northwestern 
University Press.
husserl, e. (1990) Cartesian meditations, netherlands, Kluwer academic 
Publishers.
James, w. (1892) Textbook of Psychology, london, macmillan.
lewis, d (1969) Convention, cambridge, harvard.
mauss, m. (1979) Techniques of the Body, in Sociology and Psychology, london, 
rKP.
merleau-Ponty, m. (1962) the Phenomenology of Perception, london, routledge.
merleau-Ponty, m. (1965) The Structure of Behavior, london, methuen.
meyer, l. (1956) emotion and meaning in music, chicago, chicago University 
Press.
oakeshott, m. (1991) rationalism in Politics and Other essays, indianapolis, 
liberty Fund inc.
oakeshott, m. (1999) On history and Other essays, indianapolis, liberty Fund 
inc.
winch, P. (1958) the idea of a Social Science, london, routledge.
wittgenstein, l. (1953) Philosophical investigations, oxford, Blackwell.
THE CONCEPT Of HABIT AND THE REgUlARITIES Of SOCIAl STRUCTURE  
nicK croSSley university of manchester
